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FINAL DRAFT

THE COLOR OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
Kevin Noble Maillard*
Syracuse University

Wills that prioritize the interests of nontraditional families over collateral
heirs test courts’ dedication to observing the posthumous wishes of testators.
Collateral heirs who object to will provisions that redraw the contours of
“family” are likely to profit from the incompatibility of testamentary freedom
and social deviance. Thus, the interests of married, white adults may claim
priority over nonwhite, unmarried others. Wills that acknowledge the
existence of moral or social transgressions—namely, interracial sex and
reproduction—incite will contests by collateral heirs who leverage their status
as white and legitimate in order to defeat testamentary intent.
This Article turns to antebellum and postwar will contests between
disinherited white heirs and mixed-race devisees to question the role of courts
in defining “family” and the expectancy of collaterals to uphold this
limitation. While other studies have separately examined the myth of
testamentary freedom and argued for the legitimacy of diverse families,
scholars have paid less attention to the color of inheritance. Drawing on
Cheryl Harris’s groundbreaking work on property and racial expectation
interests, this Article illustrates the centrality of whiteness in the validation of
testamentary transfers. At the same time, it questions the legal resistance to
nontraditional families, which substantially weakens the aspirational theory
of donative freedom—the cornerstone of Trusts & Estates. Through the
intersection of wills law and family law, this Article initiates a critical
inquiry of the influence of race in testamentary transfers.
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Color of Testamentary Freedom
INTRODUCTION
Death is a tragedy, but its aftermath can be a drama. Will
contests over race, sexuality, and legitimacy unearth silent
judgments1 about the meaning of family2 and the expectations3
created in kinship, which incites a legal articulation of the color of
testamentary freedom. Families mourn the decedent, and if the will
jettisons normative ideas and expectations about family and kinship4,
the collateral heirs may contest the estate envisioned by the testator
as the last will and testament. Selective attention paid to the
testator’s intent reveals a paradoxical contingency of testamentary
freedom, that core legal tenet of “do what he wills with his own.”5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I would like to
thank Don Herzog and Anita Allen for their thorough comments, and to various
faculty colloquia and conferences at New York Law School, Seton Hall University,
and the Syracuse University College of Law Junior Faculty Forum. A heartfelt
thanks to Sonia Katyal for her perspicacity and professionalism, and Anita
Krishnakumar, Josh Tate, Rose Villazor, and Melynda Price. Parts of this research
could not have been completed without the help of the O’Neill family of
Charleston, the Avery Center for African American History and Culture, and the
Charleston Historical Society. Special thank you to Rachel Godsil and Annette
Gordon-Reed for their elegant insight.
1 For a through discussion of lawsuits over dispositions considered “unjust” or
“unnatural,” see Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of
Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 960 (2006)
(hereinafter BLUMENTHAL).
2 James Hugo Johnston accumulated a number of these family disputes from the
antebellum era in his book, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION
IN THE SOUTH, 1776-1860 (1970).
3 Testamentary disagreements are recorded as early as Blackstone, who argued that
biological children received no automatic bounty in their parents’ estate. 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (“The right of inheritance, or deficient to
the children and relations of the deceased, feems to have been allowed much
earlier than the right of devifing by teftament. We are apt to conceive at firft view
that it has nature on it's fide; yet we often miftake for nature what we find
eftablifhed by long and inveterate cuftom.”)
4 Modern courts have strayed from basing family court decisions, namely custody
battles, on private biases. See, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (ruling
that private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are impermissible
considerations for removal of a white child from the custody of its natural mother
who remarried a man of a different race).
5 See, BLUMENTHAL at 963 (characterizing testamentary freedom as part of the
Scottish Common Sense tradition)
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Courts join in this jurisprudential melody that celebrates the
American ideological duet of liberty and freedom, yet statuses of
race6, sexuality7, and marriage8 potentially curtail this posthumous
wish.9 Historically, representations of testamentary diversity—the
after-death interests of nontraditional “family” over the unnamed
interests of collateral heirs test courts’ dedication to observing the
unorthodox wishes of testators. Concomitantly, transfers with white,
legitimate devisees as the objects of testamentary intent routinely
passed. When pitted against an issue of a moral or social
transgression10, testamentary intent fails.11
6

See generally, R. A. Lenhardt. Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law,
and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (2008) (arguing that
state-imposed obstacles to marriage have affected citizen rights) Florence Wagman
Roisman, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on Racially Discriminatory Donative
Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463 (2002) (exploring the effect of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act to donative transfers). See also, Estate of Monks, 48 Cal. App. 2d 603 (Cal.
App. 1941) (declaring surviving spouse as ineligible to inherit because interracial
marriage was void); Succession of Filhiol, 119 La. 998 (La. 1907) (voiding
interracial transfer as against public policy).
7 See, In re Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128 (1993) (rejecting the right of election
against decedent’s will in regards to same-sex marriage); In Re Kaufmann’s Will,
205 N.E.2d 864 (1965) (claiming undue influence of gay life partner on testator).
See also, Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225 (1981).
8 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois
statute prohibiting a nonmarital child from inheriting from its biological father).
9 Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. 84, 87
(1994) (calling for a change in inheritance laws to reflect the changing American
family).
10 See, BLUMENTHAL at 960. See also, Dees v. Metts, 17 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1944)
(describing a white man who left property to a black woman as “sinful”). Wills
involving same-sex partners also incite morality battles by disgruntled biological
family members. See also, Amy Ronner, Homophobia: In the Closet and in the Coffin, 21
LAW & INEQ. J. 65, 73 (2003) (“the will contest becomes a device for righting the
wrong, for ousting the villainous converter, and for reassembling the broken
family”)
11 Courts have served as repositories of moral sentiment in regards to protecting
disinherited family members. A number of scholars have addressed this issue with
a call for more inclusive approaches to donative transfers. See generally, Gary
Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. 275 (1999)
(championing “considers testator-compelled arbitration as a means for overcoming
the Trier of fact's propensity to invalidate any estate plan that does not conform to
majoritarian cultural norms”); Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law
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Color of Testamentary Freedom
This Article criticizes the doctrine of testamentary intent
through an historical analysis of an antebellum interracial will
contest as a paradigmatic example of the color of testamentary
freedom. Other studies have explored the juridical anomalies of
interracial will disputes, but have remained silent on the inherent
pairing of wealth and whiteness in transfers of property.12 Will
transfers that cross color lines directly challenge donative freedom by
asking courts to eschew social norms in favor of the testator’s intent.
Testators who eschewed traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and
institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves13, or both often incited will
contests that succeeded in overturning their deviant will.14 Building
upon Cheryl Harris’s concept of racialized expectancies in property
theory, my research shows that white collateral heirs, in both a first
and last resort, leveraged whiteness to contest wills that consciously
excluded them.15 In the eyes of the state, probating an interracial will
that requests an acknowledgement of forbidden love16 and its
and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (considering the
merits of same-sex inclusion within intestacy law); Melanie Leslie, The Myth of
Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996) (examining courts’ employment
of moral values in wills law) (hereinafter “LESLIE”); Al Brophy, Teaching the Race of
Testamentary Freedom (unpublished paper on file with author, 2005) (addressing the
effects of gender and race on testamentary freedom).
12 See Jason Gillmer, Suing For Freedom: Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial Identity in
the Post-Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 535, 597 (2004)
(addressing the rights of mixed-race slaves who sued for their freedom). See also,
Bernie Jones, Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable Old Men,” and “Degraded Creatures”:
Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699
(2005) (using interracial will contests to analyze the attitudes of antebellum jurists
towards interracialism).
13 Id.
14 BLUMENTHAL at 964.
15 Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51
STAN. L. REV. 221, 264 (1999) (hereinafter DAVIS) (describing will challenges
initiated by white collateral heirs).
16 Mary Boykin Chesnut’s diary reveals the conflict between public oblivion and
private knowledge of the interracial sexuality of the slave system:
God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and
iniquity....Like the patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with
their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every
family exactly resemble the white children - and every lady tells you who
is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's household, but
those in her own she seems to think drop from the clouds…
DAVIS, supra note 15 at fn 286.
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outcomes not only diminishes the authority of the law, but it also
contradicts statutory intent.17 State-sanctioned racial supremacy
generates no surprises in the antebellum South, but its overwhelming
persistence in blatant opposition to the language of the will clearly
illustrates the central and tragic fallacy of testamentary intent.18
A surprising gap in the legal literature demonstrates a failure
to contemplate race in wills as a presumptive indicator of family
membership.19 While studies have separately examined the myth of
testamentary freedom20, testamentary incapacity in interracial
transfers21 and the legitimacy of diverse families22, scholars have paid
less attention to the triangulation of race, marriage, and property as
indices of the legal parameters of kinship. This Article sharply
denounces the expectation interest23 created by these norms that
facilitate the provenance of racial supremacy and marital privilege to
exclude nontraditional family forms. Statutory schemes remain
underinclusive24, as they may not provide legal protection for those
infinitely diverse articulations of family and association25 that exist
beyond the comprehension and acceptance of the law.26 By
determining who stands eligible to inherit, wills law constructs a
property interest in legitimacy that inherently discredits, discounts,
and ultimately exposes the success of testamentary intent as
contingent on social conformity.27

17

Gillmer, infra note 87 at 39.
See LESLIE, supra note 11 at 236 (refuting the “oft-repeated axiom that
testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills law”).
19 Professor Blumenthal has also written on deviance in wills, particularly
interracial transfers of property. Her article differs because it focuses more on the
psychological aspects of wills law than the limits of testamentary freedom).
20 See generally, LESLIE.
21 See generally, BLUMENTHAL.
22 See generally, Spitko, supra note 11.
23 HARRIS at 1729-31.
24 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 111 (2007) (“The internal diversification of
the model of the conjugal family.”)
25 See note 13.
26 See supra note 11.
27 The status of family can outweigh the actual nature of relationships. Blood ties,
however remote, may trump the interest of a long-term, live-in, but nonmarital
domestic partner who is not a legal spouse. Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm Of
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 199 (2001) (explaining that “family paradigm prizes
status above need, desert, or affection”).

18
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Color of Testamentary Freedom
This Article turns to history in order to examine the direct
link between property, race, and sex. The records for this case
remained untouched in Charleston, South Carolina, for 137 years.28
The records include motions, opinions, and personal
correspondence—all written by hand in calligraphic style. I focus on
an interracial will dispute in South Carolina that straddled the end of
the Civil War and the closing of the slave regime. In this case, white
collateral heirs contested the will of their brother, Paul Durbin
Remley, who had devised his estate to his slave mistress and their
two children. In this same devise, the testator disinherited his white
relatives, exercising his belief in testamentary freedom. By thinking
of this mixed-race family as “deviant,” the white, legally legitimate
Remleys, in clear opposition to the donative intent, reap the benefits
of the color of testamentary freedom.
This historical account of an interracial will dispute retains
timeless value in its demonstration of the conflict of testamentary
freedom and race. Section One discusses the inherent testamentary
privilege of whiteness. By looking at antimiscegenation law as a
deterrent for the interracial transmission of property, the state’s
support of a normative idea of the family becomes clear. A
presumption of illegitimacy existed for interracial families, which
sharply curtailed the survivor’s rights to inherit. In the following
section, I introduce the case of Mary Remley, a white widow
accused of being a black slave. In the challenge to this claim, which
threatened her children’s inheritance of their father’s will, an
unintended relative asserts her status as a free white woman. This
will contest not only demonstrates the legal power of whiteness, but
it also underscores that privilege by resisting erroneous assaults on
racial identity. This allows whites to exclude the legal expectancies
and pecuniary interests of other whites, as long as their whiteness
remains valid. The last Section looks at the younger Remley son’s
bequest to a black slave and their two children. In this conflict, race
shifts from a disqualifier to an indicator of the limits of family.
Finally, I conclude that racial and familial constructions that defy
social norms challenge the aspirational concept of testamentary
freedom, which ultimately reveals an inherent weakness in the
cornerstone of wills law.

28

South Carolina Historical Society, Charleston, SC, Paul Remley Estate Case
Records, 1861-1867.
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I.

Inherent Privilege

Will contests force an intersectional analysis of family law
and secession law by forcing private issues of deviance into the
public realm.29 In constructing laws to protect kinfolk from unjust
disinheritance by testators, these safeguards reflexively exclude
parties who fall outside the juridical conception of family.30 On one
hand, statutory schemes protect vulnerable family members from
predictable patterns of disinheritance31 that disfavor neglected
spouses32 and nonmarital, nonbiological children.33 Spouses may not
disinherit each other34, and in most states, nonmarital children35 have
the same rights as marital children.36 At the same time, these
protections may completely contradict the testamentary intent of the
decedent by directing property away from intended devisees into the
29

BLUMENTHAL at 966.
Intestacy statutes approximate what the decedent would have wanted in the
absence of a will. These statutory constructions of family prioritize biological over
chosen family. NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 186 (2008). See also, Susan Gary,
Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. J. 1 (2000) (“intestacy
laws still reflect the nuclear family norm”).
31 Blood relations are deemed so important by courts that distant relatives can have
stronger claims over a decedent’s estate than a domestic partner. The specter of
the “laughing heir” looms large as a preventative doctrine, yet these testamentary
safeguards baselessly privilege biological family over chosen family, which allows
collateral heirs to reap the benefits of legal legitimacy. The Uniform Probate Code
has taken measures to limit the scope of succession, which prohibits inheritance
beyond grandparents and their descendants. UPC §2-103. See also David F.
Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir,” 20 IOWA L. REV. 203,
208 (1935) (predicting the change in law).
32 The Uniform Probate Code allows for spouses who were left out of a premarital
will to recover the same amount as an intestate share, with some exceptions. UPC
§2-301. Additionally, all spouses displeased with their share in a will may opt for an
elective share, depending on the length of the marriage. UPC §2-202.
33 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
34 Forty nine states (except Georgia) give the surviving spouse some right in the
estate of the decedent. UPC §2-221.
35 However, adopted children have the same testamentary rights as biological
children. See, Susan Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW &
INEQ. J. 1 (2000) (examining rights of adopted children); Jan E. Rein, Relatives by
Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why?, 37 VAND. L. REV.
711 (1984) (examining treatment of adopted children in succession laws).
36 Supra note 8.
30
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hands of “approved,” legally legitimate family that the decedent
entirely wished to circumvent.37
This presumption favoring
legitimacy entirely devalues the cornerstone of wills law,
testamentary intent, by imposing an unwanted statutory construction
of family38 that eclipses the decedent’s subjective definition which
deviates from the state’s and society’s norms of kinship.39
The idea of the “changing American family”40 perpetually
fluctuates, with the only constant aspect being the law’s recognition
of a limited version.41 Marriage has long stood as the unifying
characteristic of family, yet this venerable institution has been subject
to state control.42 Concomitant with regulation of marriage is the
regulation of property transmission, and stringent controls on who

37 At common law, courts went to extreme lengths to ascertain blood relatives of
persons who died intestate. In a 1953 Philadelphia case involving a $17,000,000
estate, 26,000 potential heirs asserted claims to the estate. The court opined,
“some persons still sincerely believe that they are entitled to her estate as next of
kin and cannot understand how any Court can fail to recognize their close
relationship to their dear and treasured Henrietta whom they never saw or knew
but of whom they have recently become so fond.” In re Garrett's Estate, 94 A.2d
357, 358-9 (Pa. 1953) (cited in Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm of Family Law, 80
N.C.L. REV. 199, n217 (2001).
38 The meaning of “family” in wills law offers a presumption strongly in favor of
the nuclear family. Beneficiaries outside this protected circle must rebut this
presumption in order to inherit. See Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession
Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063 (1999) (citing
Professor Fellow’s argument that intestacy law favors the nuclear family).
39 Id. Ralph Brashier offers a comprehensive examination of diverse families and
the problems they face with inheritance. See, R. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW
AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004).
40 A number of scholars have engaged this term to describe the challenge of law to
embrace difference rather than imposing uniformity and penalizing diversity. See
Foster, Family Paradigm at 201; Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws at 4, 58. One scholar
argues that modern families have eclipsed the specter of 1950’s nuclear television
families. Thomas Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL. L. REV.
55, 58.
41 See, ANITA BERNSTEIN, MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL
STATUS (2005).
42 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(recognizing that marriage is subject to State police power, but not unlimited);
Cleveland v. U.S. 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (regulation of marriage is a state matter); See,
DAVIS infra note 15 at fn15. See also, MILTON REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER:
LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999).
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Color of Testamentary Freedom
can get married necessarily dictates, in turn, who may inherit.43
Regulation has prevented people of the same sex44 from legal
consolidation of their interests, as well as interracial couples,45
related people,46 minors,47 and slaves.48 Relationships that fit the
state’s conception of appropriate prospective spouses receive state
protection of their relationship and of their property.49 For those
relationships existing outside of this realm of approval, securing
these same rights proves a remarkably difficult process.50
43 See generally, Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993)
(hereinafter HARRIS) (arguing that property is a form of racialized privilege).
44 Today, gay and lesbian partners, in addition to heterosexual nonmarital partners,
must overcome a presumption of nonaffiliation to decedents who die intestate.
David Chambers, What If: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) (discussing the rights of
gays and lesbians under intestacy laws).
45 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state statue
prohibiting interracial marriages). Despite the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling,
Alabama formally held on to antimiscegenation law until the year 2000. Kevin
Johnson, Taking The “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on Black-White Romance
and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs”, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 283, 300 (2007) (citing
Alabama’s statute as an example of the lingering taboo of interracial relations).
46 Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637 (1990) (voiding a marriage between a half-uncle
and a half-niece).
47 Moe V. Dinkins 533 F.Supp 623 (1982). See also, Lynn Wardle, Rethinking
Marital Age Restrictions, 21 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).
48 See, DAVIS, infra note 15 at fn 9. Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race,
Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1996)
(summarizing effects of enslavement on inheritance).
49 See, Brashier, supra note 39 at 3. For the majority of people who die without a
will, the laws of intestacy approximate the decedent’s presumed intent, which fails
to incorporate diverse family structures. Ronald Scalise Jr., Honor Thy Father and
Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV.
171, 172 (2006). (“intestacy laws are important because they embody the collective
judgment of a society as to how an individual's property should devolve in the
absence of an expression by the decedent”).
50 Upholding community standards and social norms in blatant conflict with
testamentary intent not only institutionalizes and rewards discrimination in wills
law, but it also unfairly discourages settlors to provide for their chosen family.
Testators who eschewed traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and institutions in
favor of mistresses, slaves, or both often incited will contests of testamentary
incapacity, undue influence, or fraud. BLUMENTHAL at 964. Professor Foster has
argued for the intangible benefits of wills, which include sentimental recognition of
the survivor’s importance to the decedent. Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm Of
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 199 (2001) (arguing that maintaining ownership and
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Testamentary language indeed articulates a decedent’s
subjective interpretation of family, but nontraditional estate plans
may confront a restrictive statutory scheme that bases kinship on
traditional legal and social expectations.51 In most cases, wills pass
quickly though probate because few challenges exist to slow and
lengthen the probate process. Few legal barriers prevent a civil
spouse and children from being considered as legitimate family
members.52 It is the rarer and more diverse conceptions of family
that must overcome a presumption of illegitimacy53, even when the
words of the testamentary document clearly indicate the familial role
played by the disenfranchised.54 Despite the clarity of intent,
balancing the state’s interest in the efficient distribution of property
with the testator’s legal interest in bequeathing directly challenges the
efficient meaning of “family.” This reveals an under examined
aspect of not only the privileged status gained from marriage, but
also the governmental regulation of diverse expressions of family.55
Married people’s relationships receive state protection, while deviant
families suffer in the disruptive wake of unfounded testamentary
entitlement. The collision of these interests clearly highlights the

connection to the decedent’s property “ensure[s] a continued connection with a
deceased loved one.”). Additionally, Professor Spitko has noted that testamentary
freedom encourages testators to freely distribute property, Spitko, Conforming,
supra note 11.
51 LESLIE at 238 (discussing courts’ commitment to seeing that testators uphold a
duty to family.)
52 See, Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys
in the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, (2003)
(explaining the legal formation of traditional, nuclear, heterosexual families);
Foster, infra note 27 at n2 (pointing out the mythical stereotype of the traditional
nuclear family). See also, Spitko, Nonmarital, supra note 7 at 1102 (stating that
intestacy law reflects societal understandings of family which privileges
heterosexual marriage).
53 Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial Epiphany, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2709
(2008) (describing the default legal and social approach of illegitimacy and/or
improbability of interracial families and relationships).
54 LESLIE at 236.
55 Diverse expressions of family—unmarried heterosexual couples and also
homosexual couples—find that their expressions of commitment fail to receive the
same easy protections of the heteronormative nuclear family. See Laura
Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227
(2005) (exploring inheritance law as an example of state’s views on marriage and
gender roles).
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Color of Testamentary Freedom
difference between statutory constructions of family and heirship and
the subjective representations articulated by the decedent.56

56

This concept describes the ability of testators to direct behavior after their death
by setting requirements on devisees in order to inherit. See, Shapira v. Union Nat.
Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-28 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1974).
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A. (Il)legitimacy Explained
Testamentary freedom hinges upon the racial identity of the
beneficiary. Common law dictates eligibility to inherit by declaring
heirs as either legitimate or illegitimate.57 A legitimate heir stands as
a biological descendant, born to married parents, and held out by the
decedent as his child, thus placing the descendant within a protected
class of devisees.58 Children born within state sanctioned conjugal
relationships59 rest upon the legal privilege conferred by their parents’
marriage.60 Conversely, a child born to unmarried parents held the
status of illegitimate and was not legally recognized as the decedent’s
natural child.61 This exclusion from legal protection not only
demonstrates a preference for married households, but it also refuses
to define family outside of a nuclear, male-female, marital dyad.
Legal access to the decedent’s estate—and the strength of that
claim—increased according to the state’s conception of the approved
family.

57 Blackstone characterizes bastardy, or illegitimacy, as a child without “inheritable
blood.” This status came from the child having parents not married at the time of
his/her
birth.
Blackstone’s
Commentaries
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk2ch15.htm
(“are
such
children as are not born either in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time after
it's determination”).
58 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (2007).
59 Conjugal relationships normally signify marriage, although same-sex and
different-sex cohabitants are also included. Canada has taken steps to expand the
meaning of family “beyond” conjugality to include adults living alone, sibling
pairings, and platonic cohabitating adults. See, Law Commission of Canada,
Beyond
Conjugality
Report
(2001),
available
at
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond_conjugality.pdf.
60 Intestacy law upholding the exclusion of illegitimate children if there are martial
children has been deemed constitutional. Id. At 106.
61 In wills law, preventative measures dictate minimum requirements for estate
distribution, despite testamentary intent. LESLIE at 269 (elective share statutes,
which curtail "the decedent's testamentary freedom with respect to his or her titlebased ownership interests... No matter what the decedent's intent.”) The
inheritance interests of legitimate family members traditionally trumped those of
enumerated illegitimate counterparts, although modern reforms have given
nonmarital children additional rights. Beckert, supra note 24 at 105. Yet
traditionally, law created a hierarchy of testamentary interests that did not interpret
devises to nonmarital children as viable transfers of property. Id. at 104.
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Children and partners living within non-nuclear, nonmarital
households have traditionally fallen short of the benchmark of
protection in comparison to legally legitimate parties who already
enjoy the security of the law. In the wake of protecting legitimate
family members, those outside this sphere of recognized kinship
remain vulnerable to being divested of their legal rights.62 Indeed,
legitimacy has its merits by protecting survivors of the decedent from
disinheritance and pecuniary neglect.63 Intestacy and elective shares
ensure that spouses and children retain a state-sanctioned share of
the decedent’s estate.64 These protective schemes also have a
preventative efficacy by ensuring that external parties have no greater
claims on the estate than do the legitimate family.65
For those who could not marry, legitimacy remained an
elusive status that excluded all nontraditional couples and families.
States with antimiscegenation laws did not entertain the legal
possibility of an interracial family.66 And all states, until recently67
did not recognize same sex marriages.68 In both of these exclusions,
race and sexuality intersect to pose legitimate questions about the
fiction of testamentary freedom.69 If adhesions to “legitimacy”
supersede the wishes of the testator, external norms of family
construction and kinship eclipse any subjective posthumous wish to
62

Spitko, supra note 11 at 1098.
Foster, supra note 50 at n84 (citing Via v. Putnam, 656 So. 2d 460, 466 (Fla.
1995)).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Maillard, supra note 39 at 2712. DAVIS at 231, 268.
67 California and Massachusetts grant same-sex couples the right to marry. New
York recognizes same sex marriages performed outside of New York. In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples denied gay couples of equal protection); Martinez v. County
of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (recognizing all forms of
foreign marriage, including same sex); Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (granting same-sex couples equal rights to marriage as
provided in the state constitution). Vermont, New Jersey, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire have granted same-sex couples the same right as different-sex married
couples, but these legal unions have not been classified as “marriage.” Baker v.
State, 170 Vt. 194; 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006).
68 Id.
69 LESLIE at 236. (“the oft-repeated axiom that testamentary freedom is the
polestar of wills law”).
63
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provide for an intended70 rather than (or in addition to) a legal
family. Testamentary freedom is heavily contingent on legal
permissiveness rather than the actual, biological, or conjugal
relationship between decedent and devisee. In order to confer rights
on the relation, a legally recognized relationship must exist. Law, as
a filer of efficiency71, selectively casts its legitimizing gaze.
B. Racializing Legitimacy
Antimiscegenation statutes curtailed the transfer of property
across racial lines. By declaring marriages between blacks and
whites illegal, law thwarted a secure interest of black and mulatto
beneficiaries in the estates of white testators. Without the protective
status that marriage confers, courts viewed interracial families as
inherently illegitimate, which opened estates to the rapacious
strategies of white collateral heirs. The reliability of antimiscegenist
amnesia, that is, the narrative that the interracial family does not
legally exist, fueled the redirection of testamentary intent. With the
law favoring coverage of legitimate kin over illegitimate relations,
white collaterals expected courts to supplant the beneficiaries’ named
interests in favor of themselves.
The racial identity of the
beneficiaries stimulated traditional grounds for objecting to a will:
incapacity, undue influence, and fraud.72
Miscegenation existed as a public secret in each of the slave
states. The legal derecognition of formal interracial relationships
belies the reality of their widespread existence. In his comprehensive
study on American mulattoes, Joel Williamson comments, “it is safe
to assume that the lines of lust in the old South ran continually and
in all directions.” The concubinage of black women by white men
formed the majority of interracial relations, although unions between
black men and white women were not unknown.73 A northern
70

Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 1014 (1999)
(“state legislatures can go even further in functionally recognizing families of
choice).
71 Bruce Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033 (1994) (debating the social utilities of probate efficiency).
72 BLUMENTHAL at 961.
73 Although this aspect of miscegenation deserves mention, it goes beyond the
scope of this project. For a comprehensive examination of this nexus of race and
gender, see MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN, infra note 138. I am
primarily concerned with the darkening of wealth, that is, mulatto inheritance from
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traveler in South Carolina commented, “The enjoyment of a Negro
or mulatto woman is spoken of as quite a common thing; no
reluctance, delicacy, or shame is made about the matter.”74 Despite
individual and cultural narratives asserting such liaisons through
informed channels, state marriage laws upheld rigid distinctions
between racial groups.75
Not all states prohibited interracial marriage.76 In the deep South,
South Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage until after the
Civil War and in Charleston occasional marriages occurred between
persons of color and well-regarded whites.77 The state suspended the
prohibition in 1868, only to reenact it in 1879.78 Although Loving v.
Virginia79 rendered all antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, the
state retained the law in its books until 1999.80
Antebellum
miscegenation
confounds
our
collective
understanding of racial boundaries and sexual desire. Close
proximity of blacks and whites in shared spaces81 during and
immediately after the slave era facilitated sexual availability.82 Yet
white kin, which concerns the transfer of property from white men to mixed race
offspring. See also ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW 16-19
(Albuquerque 1972) (explaining sexual stereotypes of black men and white
women).
74 WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, 145 (1968).
75 State statutes, such as in Alabama, upheld boundaries between black and white
in an attempt to segregate “the most fundamental unit of society, the family.” Julie
Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890—
1934, 20 Law & Hist. Rev. 225, 226 (2002)
76 For an interactive map detailing which states restricted interracial couples from
1662-1967, see http://www.lovingday.org/map.htm.
77 See, JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATTOES IN
THE UNITED STATES 16 (1995) (“South Carolina was unique among the British
mainland colonies not only in its blackness and easy mixing but also in that some
whites positively and publicly defended interracial sex.”)
78 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,
IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 75-6 (2003); PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT
I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 103-4
(2002).
79 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
80 S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, 33 (2003).
81 See, JOHN MICHAEL VLATCH, BACK OF THE BIG HOUSE: THE ARCHITECTURE
OF PLANTATION SLAVERY 1-17 (1993).
82 See, WILLIAMSON, supra note 70 at 15 (“The great number of slaves gave
abundant sexual opportunity to white masters and overseers.”)
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within these connected physical worlds, strict hierarchies existed to
maintain racial roles and boundaries.83 Jeffersonian perceptions of
racial difference84 articulated a public disgust for the “oorangootans”85 of the African race, thus equating interracial sex as a form
of bestiality between free white humans and enslaved black
animals.86 In dehumanizing blacks as simple mammals incapable of
sentience, talent, and memory, men leveraged their status as free and
white to exploit and violate black women.87 This version of history
survives as the collective understanding of miscegenation: forced,
asymmetrical, and purely physical.
On the other hand, a growing body of literature espouses the
possibility of an alternative narrative for interracial sex88, which

83

See, RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY 23 (2001) (“interracial
relationships were tolerated only insofar as they left norms of racial and sexual
privilege intact”).
84 In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson wrote at length on his “aversion…to the
mixture of colour in America.” See, WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK
467 (1968). Despite his own personal involvement with a mulatto slave, Sally
Hemings, Jefferson wrote at length about preferring Indian-white intermixture
over black-white intermixture, which he viewed as a different interaction of
species.
Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every
passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one, preferable to
that eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that
immoveable veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race?
Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own
judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them, as
uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black women
over those of his own species.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, “AR’N’T I A WOMAN?” FEMALE SLAVES IN THE
PLANTATION SOUTH 29-46 (rev. ed. 1999) (1985), quoted in Jason Gillmer, Base
Wretches And Black Wenches: A Story Of Sex And Race, Violence And Compassion, During
Slavery Times, 59 ALA. L. REV. __ (2008).
88 Interracial relations between free white men and enslaved black women generate
a host of reactions addressing the nature and/or possibility of consent. Many
scholars would argue that slave status precludes any form of consent and a loving
relationship, thus making all liaisons between free men and slave women rape.
Others may view the relationships as mutually beneficial, with black women
acceding to these relationships in search of better futures for themselves and their
children. Analyzing the consensual possibilities of these relationships goes beyond

10

KEVIN NOBLE MAILLARD (SYRACUSE)

Color of Testamentary Freedom
allows for recognition of diverse racial family forms in the South.89
Jason Gillmer argues for a more historicized look at interracial sex
and families from this area, which exposes the complexity and
nuance of navigating interracial relationships and families in the
context of African slavery.90 Similar to the case study in this Article,
Gillmer examines an interracial family in Texas besieged by claims
of illegitimacy despite the thirty-year relationship between a white
master and his slave. By examining both the legal and social
narratives that surround the marital-like relationship between the
interracial couple, Gillmer juxtaposes the inherent racial inequality
of the slave system with the possibility of romantic attraction
between the races.91 Eliciting this unique but not uncommon case of
antebellum interracial attraction reveals the practical intricacies of
human interaction in relation to the legal system that presumed its
implausibility.92
The greatest intellectual untility derived from Gillmer’s work is
the ability to let history tell the story of lived experiences in relation
to the law.93 In the context of miscegenation, it is a legal fiction to
say that interracial sex is prohibited and void, but the more difficult

the scope of this article, but I do believe it would be overinclusive and
anachronistic to forestall a possibility of mutual interracial attraction. See, DAVIS,
supra note 15 at n10 (citing Eugene Genovese’s analysis of master-slave
relationships beginning as exploitation and turning into love).
89 See generally, ANNETTE GORDON-REED, THE HEMINGSES OF MONTICELLO
(2008); JEFF FORRET, RACE RELATIONS AT THE MARGINS: SLAVES AND POOR
WHITES IN THE ANTEBELLUM COUNTRYSIDE (2006); CALUDIA SAUNT, BLACK,
WHITE, INDIAN: RACE AND THE UNMASKING OF AN INDIAN FAMILY (2005);
CHARLES ROBINSON, DANGEROUS LIAISONS, SEX AND LOVE IN THE
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2003).
90 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5.
91 Id. at 35.
92 Local studies of interracial families tell a different story of black-white sexuality
and romance that confound legal prohibitions against miscegenation. Close
examinations of individual families reveal stories of mutual intimacies between
master and slave that give a more complete picture of interracial relations. These
historical portraits reveal and give life to the conflict between everyday experience
and legal regulation.
See, JOSHUA ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA,
1787-1861 (2003); KENT ANDERSON LESLIE, WOMAN OF COLOR, DAUGHTER OF
PRIVILEGE (Athens, GA, 1995); ADELE LOGAN ALEXANDER, AMBIGUOUS LIVES;
FREE WOMEN OF COLOR IN RURAL GEORGIA 1789-1879 (1993).
93 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5.
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project is assessing the continuing occurrence of these deviations in
direct opposition to a legal culture that virtually guaranteed their
illegitimacy.94 Prohibiting marriage between black and white created
legal obstructions for formal recognition of these relationships, but it
did not eradicate the liaisons that occurred outside the legal realm.
Sex between master and slave went largely unpunished, and in the
eyes of the law, unrecorded.95 Yet, in the examination of local
histories, racial rhetoric and separationist doctrine implodes by
opening a “window into the consciousness of ordinary people.”96
Perceiving interracial relationships as illegitimate and implausible
stems from a legal history that privileges the interests of free whites
over those of black slaves. In cases of interracial conflict, whites
relied on the exclusion of blacks, both slave and free, to secure and
solidify their own legal interests. Cheryl Harris’s landmark work on
the social and legal benefits of racial discrimination uncovers the
“settled expectations of whites built on the privileges and benefits
produced by white supremacy.”97 Both Harris’s and Gillmer’s work
address the nature of privilege, but while Gillmer analyzes the
problem from a grassroots level, Harris depicts a legal system
inherently skewed toward forwarding the interests of whites. At this
macro-level, she forces a reconsideration of unequal racial
assumptions of property. Her critical approach to the unquestioned
racial assumptions of property law forces a necessary reconsideration
of aperspectivity.
For Harris, property inherently upholds tenets of racial
supremacy.98 Starting with a basic premise of ownership—the
dialectic of possession and exclusion—she constructs a theoretical
framework that captures the interests, both vested and anticipated,
from owning property.99 Property defines social relations100 and
94

Almost all states had legal prohibitions against interracial marriage. See Maillard,
The Multiracial Epiphany, supra note 53.
95 Angela Onwuachi-Wilig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as a
Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2393 (2007)
(citing Rachel Moran, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY) (“"Sex across the color line was
commonplace despite its racially ambiguous consequences. White men enjoyed
ready and open access to black and mulatto women as a mark of their
untrammeled freedom and privilege.").
96 Gillmer, supra note 81 at 5.
97 Harris at 281.
98 Id. at 1731.
99 Id.
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creates expectations both tangible and intangible.101 Being white
itself reflected an identity that signified one’s status in law and social
practice. While “white” marked one as inherently free and unsaved,
“black” denoted one as being subject to enslavement.102 White racial
identity and the privileged position that it inhabits invokes a property
interest with expectations that “could not be permissibly intruded
upon without consent.”103 The ability to hold and possess property,
rather that being its subject, demonstrates the crucial aspect of
racialized property interests; the absence of blackness allowed for an
unencumbered legal existence.104 Even after the slavery regime had
fallen, people of African descent continued to feel the legal echoes of
slave status.
This Article takes up where Harris stops. By taking seriously her
claim that whiteness is property, it is possible to see property interests
and racial privilege merge without subtlety in testamentary disputes.
As Harris explains the expectation interest inherent in property
theory, whiteness “retain[s] its essential exclusionary character…and
distort[s] outcomes of legal disputes.” White collateral heirs meant
for disinheritance by the testor jumped upon the opportunity to
leverage their racial identity against beneficiaries of color. As both a
first and a last resort, whiteness kept property within the “proper”
family while serving as a trump card to defeat interracial transfers.
From this assumption of entitlement emerges a triangulation of race,
sex, and property that underscored the implicit association of
whiteness and legitimacy.
II.

Race as a Marker of Testamentary Eligibility

Paul Remley, a free white man, died in Charleston in
November of 1860.105 He left his widow, Mary Remley, a farm in
Pennsylvania consisting of “19.5 acres of poor land but healthy with

100

Id. at 1728.
Harris argues that “property is a legal construct by which selected private
interests are protected and upheld.” Id. at 1730.
102 Ida 1718.
103 Ida 1731.
104 Ida 1721.
105 Account of Paul Remley’s Estate in Pennsylvania, Paul Remley Estate Case
Records, 0308.02 (R) 01, South Carolina Historical Association (hereinafter
“RCSCHS”)
101
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two small storm houses on it, no farm buildings, one old shed.”106
He appointed his son, Paul Durbin Remley (“Durbin”) as
administrator of the estate, and the younger Remley assumed charge
on December 1, 1860.107 In the following summer of 1861, Durbin
filed for a grant of administration of his father’s will. In this
capacity, he was expected to share the profits of the estate with his
siblings: Elizabeth Hubbell (née Remley) and Emma Remley. At
this time, the siblings lived in different parts of the country, with
Durbin residing in Charleston and the sisters in Pennsylvania.
The conflict within this family fluidly illustrates how external
pressures simultaneously threaten and bolster their legitimacy as a
family. In two separate will contests involving the father Paul’s will
and the younger son Durbin’s will, the racial identity of the
beneficiaries determined the outcome. Depending on the angle, law
acts both to exclude and include, and the legitimacy of heirship turns
on a secure claim to whiteness. For those actors who were able to
claim a legal identity as white, they employed law to restrict the
economic benefits of family membership to exclude those who could
not.
A. Slavery and Testation
1. Strategic Accusations of Slavery
A conflict arose when Durbin applied for the grant on June
3, 1861—the same day that a challenger questioned his legitimacy as
an administrator. Mary Shrine, claiming to be his second cousin,
filed a complaint in a Charleston Court of Ordinary alleging herself
to be a legitimate next of kin.108 Durbin and his sisters, she alleged,
were rendered ineligible due to the status of their mother. Mrs.
Shrine filed an affidavit which argued that “the supposed widow of
Paul Remley is a colored person” and that “she was purchased by
said Paul Remley as a slave.”109 Shrine attempted to position herself
as having not only a superior claim on the estate, but as the only
legitimate heir to the Remley estate. If she proved the widow Mary
106

Id.
Letter from William Hubbell (Aug 8, 1866) (RCSCHS) (hereinafter “W.
HUBBELL, AUG. 8”).
108 In the matter of Estate Paul Remley Dec’d (18 June 1861) (RCSCHS).
109 Id.
107
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as a slave, then the Remley children would follow her diminished
status; Paul, Elizabeth, and Emma would immediately become
slaves110, and ineligible to stand as legal heirs.111 Shrine, remaining as
the nearest kin eligible to inherit (i.e. free and white), could
overcome the articulated testatementary interests of Paul Remley’s
children and widow.112
The taint of slavery as the kryptonite of testation could
render any “white” heir ineligible. Mary Shrine based her argument
on South Carolina’s 1841 Act to Prevent the Emancipation of Slaves.113
This Act prohibited testamentary emancipations, and it also voided
all bequests to slaves. Section IV reads, “That every devise or
bequest, to a slave or slaves, or to any person, upon a trust or
confidence, secret or expressed, for the benefit of any slave or slaves,
shall be null and void.”114 Even if the Remleys had considered
themselves free white persons, the possibility of a hidden condition
of their mother threatened their ability to inherit their father’s estate.
2. Defending Whiteness
The accusation of diminished legal and racial status, however
farfetched, generated a flurry of representations of Remley family
110

Legal definitions of children’s status throughout the South followed Roman law
by declaring partus sequitur ventrem—that children followed the condition of the
mother. Wikramanayake, supra note
111 A number of fictional books appealed to this white fear—of sudden and
unexpected relegation to slavery. In his meticulous book on mulatto imagery in
Victorian fiction, ROBERT MENCKE, MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE 198 (1979)
explains, “what threat could be more dire than that of the blood of the inferior
races of the world secretly slipping into that of the mighty civilizing race of AngloSaxons?” Examples of such books are REBECCA HARDING DAVIS, WAITING FOR
THE VERDICT (1867); ALBION TOURGEE, PACTOLUS PRIME (1890); WILLIAM
DEAN HOWELLS, AN IMPERATIVE DUTY (1892); .
112 It must be pointed out, however, that race did not serve as a constant
determinant of status. For children with parents of different races, the mother
could be black or mulatto and pass her free status to her child. Likewise, children
of black or mulatto slave fathers and free white women, while very few in number,
retained free status, despite their father’s condition. EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL
JORDAN ROLL (1976).
113 Act to Prevent the Emancipation of Slaves, and for Other Purposes (1841), quoted in
Joliffe v. Fanning & Phillips, 31 S.C. Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 186, 190 (1856); See also
DAVIS, supra note 15 at 251.
114 Id.
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history. The competing claims to the status of Mary Remley, who
offered no voice in the available correspondence, demonstrate a
flurry of legal panic in the race to reassert the primacy of whiteness
and freedom. If the Remley children followed the condition of their
mother, not only would they lose testamentary and legal standing,
but also their public reputations as free white persons.
In an effort to bolster their legitimacy, the Remleys offered
testimony from “respectable” white persons to verify their freedom
and race. These narrative contributions necessarily referred to the
past, offering a subjective view of Mary Remley’s standing in the
community. These acts of remembering had legal and practical
relevance, but they also reasserted the Remley family as white,
privileged citizens. In reconstructing their racial identity by means of
community opinion, the family followed a well-established
precedent. Whether these claims were made public outside the
protection of the court remains unknown, but the singular assertion
and multiple refutations as documented in the legal records
commemorate a type of juridical discussion of sexual and racial
privacy that was routinely relegated beyond the scope of public
discourse.
The Remley “defendants,” like any party in litigation,
selectively remembered advantageous facts and omitted pejorative
ones. Soon after the supposed cousin filed the accusatory affidavit in
the Court of Ordinary, the Remley party called upon Sam Wagner, a
free white man and a churchgoing citizen of Charleston, to verify
Mrs. Remley’s whiteness. As a member of Bethel Methodist
Church, Mr. Wagner testified that Mr. and Mrs. Remley were
“always recognized as white persons in the use of all the privileges of
the Church”115 He continues by attesting to their status as
“acceptable members” and active “Class Leaders.” Unmentioned in
this written testimony are references to miscegenation or slavery.
Mr. Wagner’s narrative limits itself to public interpretations of racial
identity. As expected, he makes no mention of Mrs. Remley’s
questionable origins, focusing instead on Mr. Remley’s secure status
as a free white man and Mrs. Remley’s white father. Additionally,
he remains silent on the Church’s significant black and mulatto

115

Affidavit of Sam Wagner (June 27, 1861) (RCSCHS).
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members, who at that time constituted the majority of Charleston’s
black Methodists, approximately 6,000 in number.116
Characterizing the allegation as a “question of Pedigree and
legitimacy,”117 the Court of Ordinary postponed the decision of grant
in order to accommodate the contestant Mrs. Shrine by allocating
one week for her to provide corroborating testimony.
When she
failed to prove the slavery claim, the Court found Durbin legally
competent to administer his father’s estate. In the absence of
supporting evidence from Mrs. Shrine regarding the truth of her
accusation, Wagner’s sole opposing affidavit proved sufficient to
defeat the objection to Durbin’s grant of administration. The Court
qualified this ruling, however, by distinguishing legitimacy for
administration from legitimacy for distribution. Noting that the
possible truth of Shrine’s claim would not greatly affect the pending
grant, the Court added “altho it may become so in a progress of
settlement of assets of said Estate.”118
Legally, the Court’s finding voided the issue, but the family
continued to discuss the “great annoyance and mortification.”119 In
correspondence and memoranda, Elizabeth Hubbell continued to
refute the claims of race and slavery, writing from Philadelphia to
her brother Durbin “a very long epistle” chronicling their family’s
history of respectability and whiteness.120 Mrs. Hubbell’s pride
prevents her from explicitly addressing the assault to her family’s
racial identity, telling her brother that “the astonishment the thing
has occasioned may be better imagined than described.”121 To her
knowledge, their father was “not the man to lower himself by such a
degrading act as is alleged.”122 She viewed these charges as a
“conspiracy” organized by “low people” who unjustifiably wanted to
deprive the Remley children of their inheritance. In desperation,
Hubbell expressed her conviction that the “whole thing [was] gotten
up by some of [Durbin’s] enemies,” notwithstanding the

116 EDWARD LILLY ED., HISTORIC CHURCHES OF CHARLESTON 43-44 (Charleston,
1966).
117 In Court of Ordinary (June 29, 1861) (RCSCHS).
118 Id.
119 Letter from Elizabeth Hubbell to Paul D. Remley (July 7, 1861) (RCSCHS)
(hereinafter “E. HUBBELL LETTER”).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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“[un]intelligent” Mrs. Shrine whose “Mother was subject to some
sort of fits.”123
B. Reconstructing Whiteness
Elizabeth Hubbell takes an adversarial stance in her letters,
which makes these documents a source of critical interpretation. In
writing she expressed her racial frustrations, while advocating her
biased conception of her family’s racial identity. Looking backward
to the past for explanation, she draws upon unquestioned
relationships to justify her own self-identity and that of her mother.
She becomes the architect of her family’s history by realigning the
past to justify her present needs. Even if Hubbell’s labor of
remembering finds ground in unstable sources, she appropriates a
verisimilitude to her past that may be at odds with historical truths.124
In this battle of competing whitenesses, each party expects their legal
rights to follow the privileged condition of their racial identity.
Three primary examples of lived whiteness form her grounds
for remembering her family as white. First, she recalls that her
mother was registered at the multiracial Bethel Methodist Church in
Charleston as a “free white person,” a demonstrative fact which she
interprets as conclusive proof. 125 “[H]ad there been any doubt of the
fact,” she writes, “I imagine her name could not have been entered
there.”126 Second, her mother’s wedding to her father at Bethel serves
as proof of their supposedly irreproachable whiteness. She maintains
that her mother’s bridesmaids were “ladies of respectability” who
would not be “intimate with a person of doubtful pretensions.” Her
123

Id.
See generally, W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE ED., WHERE THESE MEMORIES GROW:
HISTORY, MEMORY AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 5 (Chapel Hill, 2000).
125 Her reliance on the church’s record of its members does not account for the
possibility of errors in representation, similar to simple and learned mistakes of
census takers. Oftentimes, census takers and other keepers of official records
make erroneous estimates of a person’s race, thus recording some AfricanAmericans of fair complexion as “white.” In sole reliance upon these subjective
measures of record-keeping for posterity, genealogists, historians, and other
scholars may draw fatuous conclusions that have substantial effects on
contemporary interpretations of racial identity. For an insightful interpretation of
this problem, see Kennedy, supra note 78 at 1-12 (chronicling the events of Green v.
City of New Orleans).
126 E. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 119.
124
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logic assumes an if/then calculation that makes reputation a
barometer of racial identity: “If she had been purchased and held as a
slave all these things could not have been.”127 Lastly, she turns to her
mother’s parentage and upbringing, noting that her mother’s mother
was an orphan, “brought up by strangers.”128 Her mother’s father, of
Jacksonboro, South Carolina, “was of a respectable family, scarcely
likely to intermarry with a low person.”129 In each of these specious
arguments, Elizabeth blindly accepts a tautology of race and
reputation that equates “respectability” with whiteness and freedom
and “doubtful pretensions” with blackness and slavery.130
Elizabeth’s letter to her brother assumed a candid tone,
revealing potentially shameful family intimacies. She did not intend
for it to be used in a court of law—rather she vented her personal
frustrations into a written narrative that memorializes her shock,
127

ID.
Elizabeth Hubbell’s husband William rushed to his wife’s defense by
composing a memorandum to his attorney that traced the ancestry of his wife’s
mother. William Hubbell, Memorandum for James B. Campbell Esq. In the
Matter of the Estate of Paul Remley, Deceased, on behalf of his widow Mary
Remley & Children, written in 1861, but not sent “on account of hostilities
preventing.” (document not shared until November 9, 1886) (RCSCHS)
(hereinafter “W. HUBBELL MEMO”. He too employed an equation of race and
reputation to dismiss Shrine’s claims. Polite white persons marry and consort with
persons like themselves. Mrs. Remley married a decent white man, and kept
company with proper white Charlestonians. Therefore, Mrs. Remley must be
white. He fortifies this logic with genealogical information about her parents
Thomas and Leah Whitley, offering additional evidence to his wife’s rendition.
Thomas Whitley, he argues, came from an English family of “respectable noble
descent,” which he attests to be listed in Burke’s Peerage of Landed Gentry. See generally
BURKE'S GENEALOGICAL AND HERALDIC HISTORY OF THE LANDED GENTRY
(L.G. Pine ed. 1952) Leah, on the other hand, he portrays as a daughter of a fallen
soldier of the Revolutionary War and a woman of unknown origins. Remarkably,
he does not question any deeper meaning or possibility of “unknown.” Still, this
liaison of high and low, noble and plebian produced “an exemplary moral and
Christian woman” who with her husband, operated a well-known grocery store in
Charleston.
129 E. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 119.
130 William Hubbell (spouse of Elizabeth) offers a radically different explanation
for Mrs. Remley’s alleged status. He surmises that a love triangle spawned the
accusation of Mary Remley’s mother as a “colored slave.” Apparently, Leah
Whitley jilted Joseph Mitchell, who in turn married Mary Mitchell, the informant.
W. HUBBELL, AUG. 8, supra note 107. Embittered by a prolonged two years of
rejection, Mitchell maliciously told others that Leah was a “colored slave.”
128
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pain, and disbelief in the fragility of her racial identity. Both
Elizabeth and her husband William created lively renditions of the
Remley past in order to protect their testamentary legitimacy. It
seems that Mrs. Shrine’s claim never penetrated the veil of
believability for either the Court or the Remleys, but her farfetched
claim provides an illuminating script to analyze the use of race as a
qualifier of standing for inheritance.131 It also demonstrates the
extent that courts would entertain such a testimony in patent
opposition to the elder Remley’s intent. Freedom of testation would
fail in the event of a legitimate claim of slavery. Knowing this, Mrs.
Shrine floated on the presumption of the incompatibility of blackness
and exclusion.

131

Harris at 1741; Jones, supra note 31 at 701.
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III. Race and the Limits of Family
The authority to contest a will directly relates to one’s status
within the law. Those who enjoy the legal privileges of property—in
this case, the security of whiteness, enter a will contest on the
offensive. The younger Paul Remley (Durbin), disinherited his white
family in Pennsylvania upon his death in 1863, devising his South
Carolina estate to a black woman and their two children. In this
subsequent case, the Pennsylvania family assumed the role of white
collateral heirs, in sharp contrast to their role as besieged and
presumed slaves. At this point, they became unassaibly white.
Although Durbin’s choice of family became quite apparent in his
will, the South Carolina Equity Court resisted recognition of this
nonmarital, interracial unit. Again, freedom of testation hinged on
the racial identity of the beneficiaries. The Hubbell-Remleys, as
legitimate and white collateral heirs, challenged the will which
acknowledged interracial sexuality. Durbin’s nontraditional devises
did not convince the court that probating the will was morally
justifiable.132
Apparently, Durbin lived a quiet life as a wealthy planter in
the Carolina Lowcountry. Few, if any, texts of state history record
his name as a prominent figure in Southern politics, agricultural
affairs, or Charleston society. At the time he applied to administer
his father’s will in 1861, he lived on a plantation known as Remley’s
Point in the Charleston District. On this 305 acre plot situated in
Christ Church Parish at the junction of the Cooper and Wando
Rivers,133 Paul D. Remley lived with his slave Philis134 and their two
132

LESLIE at 236.
Historical Overview of the 4th Avenue Tract, Remleys Point. (on file with the
Avery Research Center for African American Culture, College of Charleston).
134 No official bill of purchase exists for the slave Philis, but census records loosely
provide an understanding of who she was. The 1870 census lists both her and
Cecile as “black” rather than “mulatto,” so we may assume that Philis and her
daughter were of sufficiently dark complexion as to lead the census taker to
classify them as of unmixed blood. In 1861, she would have been approximately
18 years old, the mother of a seven-year old son Charles, and pregnant with her
daughter Cecile. The 1870 federal census lists Philis, black, as 27 years old, and
Cecile, black, as seven. However, litigation documents in 1866 verify Cecile being
five years old. These records would also make her a mother at age 12. (on file
with the Charleston County Public Library, South Carolina History and Genealogy
Section).
133
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children. Durbin also owned a brick house and lot135 on Society
Street in downtown Charleston, which was a common practice for
wealthy planters in the Carolina Lowcountry.136 State records show
that he bought and sold slaves fairly regularly.137
Interracial sex and cohabitation existed in the antebellum
South within unspoken codes of behavior. Durbin could maintain
Philis and their children at his plantation with impunity because her
slave status eviscerated any claim of legitimacy on their sexual
relationship. As the slave mistress of Paul D. Remley, she tacitly
assumed the role of wife and paramour, as he remained unmarried
throughout his life. As the mother of his only two children, Philis
claimed a distinct role at Remley’s Point. Nominally a slave but
almost a wife, she assumed an ambiguous role of partner and servant
not unknown to women of color in the antebellum South.138 Even
though South Carolina law allowed for interracial marriage139, it
applied to free blacks only, thus preventing the legal legitimization of
miscegenous relationships between master and slave. Slavery
precluded any legally recognized relationships, thus securing the
135

He also owned two uninhabited lots in Charleston. See Plan Showing 16 Town
Lots On Anson, Society, East Bay And Wentworth Streets, Surveyed By Charles
Parker, Series L10005, Reel 0001, Plat 00493 (on file with South Carolina Dept. of
Archives and History).
136 See generally EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE
SLAVES MADE 427 (New York, 1976) (discussing Charleston’s development as a
cosmopolitan center for the plantation aristocracy).
137 See George Henry to Paul Remley, Bill of Sale For a Slave Named Amey,
Series S213003, Vol. 005D, p. 0001 (Sept 9, 1820) (on file with the South Carolina
Dept. of Archives and History); Paul Remley To Thomas Buller King of St.
Simons Island, Ga., Bill of Sale For a Slave Named Limehouse, by Trade a
Bricklayer, Series S213003, Vol. 005K, p. 00314 (Nov. 17, 1830) (on file with the
South Carolina Dept. of Archives and History)
138 The question of emotion and intimacy in interracial relations in the South,
particularly between white men and black slave women, has received great
attention in many disciplines, with no agreement on how to characterize them. I
certainly do not intend to address that contentious issue, seeing that it goes beyond
the scope of this project. Other scholars, however, offer meticulous historical
studies. See generally JOSHUA ROTHMAN, NOTORIOUS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
SEX AND FAMILIES ACROSS THE COLOR LINE IN VIRGINIA, 1787-1861 (Chapel
Hill, 2003); F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK: ONE NATION’S DEFINITION
(Pennsylvania State University, 2001); MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK
MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (New Haven, 1999);
GENOVESE, supra note 136.
139 See, supra note
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sexual freedom of white men. Furthermore, Durbin and Philis did
not challenge what Adrienne Davis has termed the Southern “sexual
economy”140 by formally affirming their relationship with the state.
In this choice, Durbin faithfully believed that recorded word would
suffice in the distribution of his estate.
Testator appreciation for wills—their ritual, the solemnity,
the gravity—incorrectly assumes that death solidifies intended
posthumous transfers, thus following the common law aspiration of
freedom of testation.141 This doctrine would doggedly argue for the
careful distribution of property as the decedent saw fit, in accordance
with a validly drawn, witnessed, and executed will.142 Far too often,
courts and collateral heirs ignore testamentary language to
reformulate a will that more closely conforms to state-mandated
schemes of distribution. The color of testamentary freedom defeats
donative intent to reapportion the estate for the unintended benefit of
related, but clearly undesirable heirs.
A. “Die and endow, a college or a cat”
Yet Durbin would show his appreciation for this relationship
upon his death. He died on December 25, 1863 while hunting,
which Philis describes in a letter as “the discharge of his Gun by
shooting marsh hens in company with Major Bolks and John Antley
the ball entered his lungs of which he survived 13 days after being
shot[.]”143 In his will, he provided for his slave-widow and their
children an annuity of $500 per year, to be paid from the sales of his
property both real and personal.144 He also bequeathed “his
Negroes,” meaning Philis, Charles, and Cecile, to a friend “to have
the labor and services of the said slaves and their issue for and during
his natural life.”145 Durbin did not intend to relegate his family to a
state of abject slavery, but to place them “under the control of kind
and indulgent owners, who will, whenever the law permits manumit
and make them free.”146
140

DAVIS, supra note 15 at 228.
Leslie at 235 (“Courts and scholars often treat freedom of testation as if it were
a fundamental tenet of our liberal legal tradition.”)
142 Id. at 345.
143 Letter from Philis to Elizabeth Hubbell (June 1, 1865) (RCSCHS).
144 Paul D. Remley Will, Remley’s Point Collection, available at Avery Research
Center for African American History and Culture, College of Charleston.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
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South Carolina courts frequently tried such issues. In Fable &
Franks v. Brown, a white man established a trust in his will for his two
“illegitimate coloured children by a female slave.”147 The plaintiffs,
claiming to be the next of kin of the testator, objected to the will,
claiming that such bequests to slaves were invalid. On appeal, the
court approved the bequest on its face, upholding the testator’s
wishes. As a caveat, however, the court compared the man’s will to
the freedom of providing posthumous support for a favorite pet or
object, saying, “Die and endow, a college or a cat.”148 Even though
the court validated the will, the property reverted to the state,
because slaves, as property, could not inherit.
Durbin’s scheme differs, however, because of timing, thus
allowing circumvention of the legal prohibition on slave bequests
and manumissions. He did not leave his property to his slave family
directly, but to an administrator to carry out his wishes. In this
testamentary trust, his family would receive the interest resulting
from the state of his personal property that he could not leave to
them directly because they were slaves.149 Additionally, he did not
manumit the slaves in his will, but he allowed for its possibility in the
future, but at the time of probate, this issue was moot. Had the will
been executed while Phillis and the children remained slaves, the
court may have followed Fable.
Durbin’s semantics of slavery in his will deserves further
scrutiny. Although Philis argues that she and her children had been
emancipated by the time he wrote his will, he nevertheless referred to
them as though they were slaves. Had he left them property directly,
he would have placed their interests in jeopardy considering that the
1841 prohibition on slave bequests had yet to be overturned.150
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Fable & Franks v. Brown, 10 S.C. Eq. (1 Hill Eq.) 378, 379 (1835).
Id. at 397.
149 See supra note 113.
150 The clause reads,
Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives, now met and sitting in
General Assembly, and by the authority of the same, That any bequest, deed of
trust, or conveyance, intended to take effect after the death of the owner, whereby
the removal of any slave or slaves, without the limits of this State, is secured or
intended, with a view to the emancipation of such slave or slaves, shall be utterly
void and of no effect, to the extent of such provision; and every such slave so
bequeathed, or otherwise settled or conveyed, shall become assets in the hands of
any executor or administrator, and be subject to the payment of debts, or to
148
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Additionally, he did not free them in the will, but he expressed the
hope that their new owners would manumit them “whenever the law
permits.”151 Although the Emancipation Proclamation affected
many states, it did not necessarily free all slaves in South Carolina,
and all slaves, regardless of residence, were freed by the 13th
Amendment in 1865.152 In referring to them as slaves, Durbin
captures a memory of them as favored and faithful servants instead
of beloved and deserving family members. In this move, he formally
maintains distance between himself and Philis, thus underscoring a
Southern code of racial propriety.
Durbin’s goodwill toward his black family makes a strong
statement as to his parental allegiances. Although he does not
acknowledge his children as his blood, his testamentary wishes
clearly state his economic concerns for his family, and he
memorializes his intimacy with Philis in a legal document that leaves
little room for alternative explanations. He expressed a desire to sell
his property “to be appropriated for the use, clothing and comfort in
sickness and health” for her and the children.153 In this document, he
rejects the interests of his collateral white heirs, which he noticeably
refrains from mentioning until the end of the will. In this devise, he
leaves his residual estate to his mother Mary Remley, and upon her
death to his sister Emma. In no place in the will does he mention his
sister Elizabeth Hubbell.
distribution amongst the distributees or next of kin, or to escheat, as though no
such will or other conveyance had been made.
See supra note 113.
151 Paul D. Remley Will, supra note 144.
152 At the time of Durbin’s death, President Lincoln had issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, which declared that “all persons held as slaves…shall be then,
thenceforward, and forever free[.]”
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Emancipation
Proclamation (January 1, 1863) in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
28-31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). This decree most likely did not change Philis’s
slave status, as South Carolina remained a rebellious state that resisted actual
emancipation until the physical arrival of Union troops. LARRY KOGER, BLACK
SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVEMASTERS IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860
190 (1985). The possibility of the exceptional change in her status would have
entangled Durbin’s will in a problematic archaism—he made provisions for slave
succession after emancipation and these promises found no political or legal
grounding. Possibly freed, but indicated as slaves in the will, Durbin’s legacy to
Philis, Charles, and Cecile, as a post-emancipation testament, made itself
vulnerable to attack.
153 Id.
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Durbin disinherited his sisters because he found their
opinions of his family objectionable. Elizabeth’s previous letter
regarding their mother’s racial identity revealed strong disapproval of
race mixing, which she described as “degrading” and “low.” In
finding a subject to channel her frustrations and convictions, she
demonstrates her disapproval of miscegenation to her brother
without explicit mention of his own transgressions.
The Remley case stands apart from other interracial
inheritance cases because of the prevalent influence of the Civil War.
Durbin’s will remained untouched for three years after his death,
which coincides with the war’s end. Presumably, hostilities between
the Union and the Confederacy deterred not only the rapid
administration of wills, but also communications between North and
South. Correspondence amongst multiregional families such as the
Remley’s dissipated to such an extent that years passed without
hearing news from relatives in distant places. This case is no
exception, and postwar letters circulated amongst the family
demonstrate delayed notifications of salient events. In the period
between Durbin’s death and the subsequent litigation, the
transformations of war raise this standard yet mildly transgressive
postmortem distribution to a juridical exercise of reconstructing the
past.
Correspondence from Charleston completes the cycle of
belated information about uncommunicated family episodes. As
proxy for Durbin, Philis responds to the sisters on June 1, 1865, with
her own tragic news of Durbin’s death. In this response, she conveys
a sense of loneliness, despair, and depression. Philis’s letter sparks a
chain of events that leads to the eventual dispute over inheritance. In
this correspondence, she conveys an intimacy with Durbin that
alludes to mutual intimacy. A full two years after his death, she
recalls:
My Dear Mistress the morning of which he died
was Christmas on that Morning he Called me to
wash him saying that he felt so much better and said
that he did not think that his mother was alive and
was Desirous of seeing his sisters also he said on the
Morning that Christmas Morning was a Mourning
Day to the Family which after he called on me to
give Him the Bible to read of which I did & said that
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he was thankful to God for his Mercies towards Him
to spare his life to see that happy Morning[.]154
This candid vignette shows intimacy between Durbin and Philis
that she relays without hesitation to his two white sisters. Philis
nevertheless remains deferential and observant in her writing by
repeatedly referring to Durbin as “My Dear Master,” but she also
conveys her attachment to him by eventually admitting “you do not
know how it destroyed me” and that “I truly Miss him.”155 At the
close of her letter, she pleads for the sisters to return to Charleston
“to relieve [her] Distressing mind” and to “find a Friend.” The
exercise of recalling her beloved’s death renewed the pain she once
felt, as she laments, “I would say more but by heart ache me to think
of the past or look at the present.”156
B. Race-ing to a Will Contest
Durbin’s will serves as intriguing memoranda of a socially averted
yet physically manifested chapter of slaveholding society. Yet this
case turns that silence on its head. In re Remley does not stand alone
by any means—other cases in South Carolina exemplify the not
uncommon practice of miscegenation and concomitant testamentary
expressions of compassion.157 The law’s resistance to testatementary
diversity demonstrates the existence of a “problem” that could not be
avoided. The transfer of property and wealth from white to black
memorializes the testator’s preference to designate these goods in the
interests of his mixed race family. This deliberate act of prioritizing
the economic interests of his black family invites a public
postmortem discussion of miscegenation that in his lifetime,
remained purely private. In this act, he calls upon law to investigate,
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Letter from Philis, supra note 143.
Id.
156 Id.
157 See also Somers v. Smyth. 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des. Eq.) 214 (1803); Miller v. Mitchell, 8
S.C. Eq. (Bail. Eq.) 428 (1831); Fable and Franks v. Brown, 10 S.C. Eq. (1 Hill Eq.)
290 (1835); Farr v. Thompson, 25 S.C. Eq. (4 Rich.Eq.) 37 (1839); Carmile v. Carmile
16 S.C. Eq. (McMul. Eq.) 635 (1842); Monk v. Pinckney, 30 S.C. Eq. (9 Rich.Eq.)
279 (1857); Dougherty v. Executors of Doughtery, 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 63 (1848);
Ford, Escheator v. Dangerfield, 29 S.C. Eq. (8 Rich.Eq.) 95 (1856); Jolliffe v. Fanning &
Phillips, 31 S.C.Eq. (10 Rich.Eq.) 186 (1856).
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affirm, and sustain the legitimacy of his subjective articulation of
family. Yet, within a racial regime that prioritized propriety over
deviance, the question of whose interests are served challenges the
lofty theory of testatmentary freedom.
Counsel for the Hubbell’s contended that the will intended to spite
Elizabeth and her mother by “putting the Negroes over” their
interests.158 In this contest, the sisters objected to the will on three
primary grounds: 1) that testamentary transfers to slaves were
invalid; 2) that Durbin appropriated his father’s estate for his own
use and enjoyment; and 3) that the postwar devaluation of Durbin’s
estate deprived them of any interest in his property.
1. The Slavery Claim
The intention to establish a trust for Philis and the children
immediately drew the attention of the Hubbell’s, who viewed them
not as eligible parties for a testamentary transfer, but as bonded
persons precluded from exercising legal and economic interests.159 A
bill of complaint opposing Philis’s interest described the bequest as
“contrary to Equity and good conscience.”160 This rebuttal draws
upon a conception of the past that eternally equates blackness with
slavery.
Even though Durbin wrote his will after Lincoln’s
emancipation of Philis and the children, common sense would
dictate that the Hubbell’s’ slavery claim found no legitimate ground.
Still, Elizabeth and her husband persisted to contest Durbin’s intent
to provide for and support his chosen family; they saw not a family
but a gang of slaves that threatened their free and racialized interest
in his estate.
Their focus on the slave status of Philis and her children
demonstrates the Hubbell’s’ racially motivated objections, and they
rely on race privilege as a persuasive method for denying the validity
of the will. They do not deny the existence of the miscegenous
relationship, as their correspondence demonstrates this knowledge.
Because they did not directly attack Philis and her children’s racial
status as impediments to inheritance, the slavery argument displaces
this expected rebuttal by fixating on their former lives as slaves.
Presumably, the Hubbell’s realized the weakness of this objection to
158

Unsigned memo to Messrs. Ledyard and Boulon (Nov 9, 1866) (RCSCHS).
Id.
160 Ziba B. Oakes Bill of Complaint (Nov. 9, 1866) (RCSCHS).
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the will, seeing that its postwar execution and contestation dates
made the slavery issue almost moot. Only under Confederate law
could this claim have succeeded.
Philis readily responded to this fatuous claim by asserting her
rights gained as a free woman. In her answer to the Hubbell’s’
complaint, she insisted upon the validity of the will, emphasizing its
creation after her manumission. Arguing for its possible validity
under the regime of slavery, she emphasized that “having been
actually emancipated and made free before the distribution of the
estate of Paul D. Remley such bequest should be held good and
valid.”161 On the strength of this claim, she succeeded in establishing
her ability to inherit property.
2. Whether Durbin’s “Appropriation” was Proper
Competing conceptions of the past reemerge in the
interpretation of “property” of the elder Paul Remley’s estate. As
stated above, the Hubbell’s maintained that Philis and her children
were ineligible to inherit as slaves, but they expanded this argument
by also asserting that the slaves existed as part of the elder Remley’s
estate. In this line of thought, their father’s death entitled them to a
share in the slave property, which they argued that Durbin
“appropriated them to his own use and purposes.”162 They expected
Durbin, once appointed as administrator of the estate, to convert the
father’s personal property into money and divide the proceeds
equally amongst the heirs. Of this personal property, which William
Hubbell estimated at $36,000, Elizabeth, Emma, and Durbin would
each receive $12,000.163
In the interest of securing a share in Durbin’s estate, the
Hubbell’s appropriated the meaning of chattel slavery. Here, they
did not view Philis as a long-term acquaintance or fellow heir, but as
merchandise which Durbin mishandled in the administration of his
father’s estate. Philis shifts from an article of property to an
161 Separate answer of Philis a freed woman, South Carolina District Court, In
Equity (Dec. 28, 1866) (RCSCHS).
162 W. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 107 .
163 Hubbell catalogues the personal property as: “about 30 negroes value $25 K
and personal property on the farm: value $4K; Cotton $2K. He cut wood also
which he had no right to do, a thousand or more cords: value $3K; Insurance
stock $2K. [TOTAL] $36K.” Id.
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obstruction of right, one that displaces their expectation to
inheritance.164 In other words, Durbin’s enumeration of Philis as a
beneficiary rather than a parcel reduces the total value of the money
they argued belonged to them.
He says they are his slaves and then dispenses of
their services as his own property to another person,
exclusive of the other heirs—“expressis imicis alterias
exclusis.” If they as he says are taken as his and
dispenses of by him as his then he excludes the other
heirs and they can claim for value received by him.165
Philis, they believed, was not exclusively Durbin’s. Even though
he called them “my negroes Philis and her children,”166 the Hubbells
claimed they were theirs as well. This way of remembering the past,
although legally motivated, aims to diminish the status of Philis as a
rightful beneficiary. Even by invoking her monetary value, they
cannot reasonably relegate her to slave status, but they can insist on
recovering this money to aggrandize a greater share than Durbin had
allotted. Thus, in describing Philis as an object of property rather
than its recipient, the white collateral heirs seek financial security
through a shrewd manipulation of the past.
3. The Devaluation of Durbin’s Estate
The value of Durbin’s estate directly relates to the outcome
of the Civil War. He wrote his will after the war began, taking into
account the then-current value of his property. At that time, he
considered his estate valuable enough to yield $500 a year for the
comfort and clothing of Philis and her children. Alternatively, he
authorized his trustee James Gray to pay them the amount in full “if
in his judgment he shall deem it judicious and proper.”167 This
estimate of his finances and holdings predated the fall of the
Confederacy and the collapse of its economy. Durbin remained
aware of the possible effects of the war, as he directed his executors
to invest his money conservatively to safeguard his postmortem
worth throughout the war. He entrusted them to invest in “safe
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HARRIS at 1740, 1758.
W. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 107.
166 Paul D. Remley Will, supra note 144.
167 Id.
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Securities, or real estate…until the declaration of peace between
these Confederate States and the United States[.]”168
Durbin’s antebellum legacy to his black family, which would not
take effect until after the war, makes an intriguing study of the
influences of history on memory.
At once, the document
encompasses three modes of temporality: past, present, and future,
each intervening to construct, commemorate, and sustain posterity of
interracial wealth marked by the mercurial economy of the embattled
South. When he wrote his will he remembered his property as he
could only imagine—the economic upheaval of the agrarian based
political system which supplied his wealth superseded his
testamentary objectives. As much as he tried to secure his property
for Philis, he could not accurately account for the devaluation of his
estate that would swallow his secondary bequests to his mother Mary
and sister Emma. From his standpoint, the subversive act of
enriching the economic lives of his black kin would transcend his
death. In his own act of remembering and securing the past, he
could not contemplate an unforeseen and unprecedented future.
The Civil War’s effect on property values generated additional
testimonies. His executor, Optimus Hughes, submitted an answer to
the Equity Court that described the conditions of the estate in the
aftermath of the Civil War. Returning to Charleston after serving in
the Confederate Army, Hughes found his papers and accounts
destroyed. He recalled the poor economic climate, saying that
“everybody was oppressed with anxiety and great poverty scarcely
knowing what to do to obtain food for their families.”169
The disinherited Hubbells argued that the legacy to Philis and
her children deprived them of their fair share in distribution.
Objecting to the “fallacy of [Durbin’s] expectations,” they were not
“willing to bear all the losses and give her the full measure of the
legacy.”170 Here lies a problem of ademption as a result of interstate
conflict. In an 1866 memorandum to their attorneys, the Hubbells
contended:
But as to Durbin’s will it was made with the view that
there would be no loss in the Estate—but under the
Southern Confederacy would be valuable and that he
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Separate answer of Optimus Hughes (Dec. 24, 1866) (RCSCHS).
170 W. HUBBELL LETTER, supra note 107.
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could afford to give her $500 a year on 8,000 or so
absolutely out of his share—and have much left.171
Their primary objection to Durbin’s will focuses not only on the
devaluation, then, but also his misappropriation of property to which
they felt entitled. While the two sisters had moved north to
Pennsylvania, Durbin remained in South Carolina, inhabiting the
valuable plantation at Remley’s Point and the other properties in
Charleston. They believed that even if Durbin’s will did not make
them primary beneficiaries, they deserved a share in their father’s
estate, which they believed Durbin had hoarded for himself. If his
executors sold this property to provide for Philis, she would take
“their” property.
C. Testamentary Drama
The performative aspect of will disputes surfaces in the courts,
where competing conceptions of the past come forth. Three parties
offer different versions of what the testator intended to bequeath to
the heirs: First, the deceased party offers a written document as
evidence of his intentions. In this testamentary language, he outlines
desired plans for the estate after his death in the presence of
witnesses that can attest to its veracity. Durbin, with three witnesses
and an equal number of executors, constructed a plan to support his
companion and their children beyond his death. Second, the named
beneficiary offers a similar conception of the past, and she persists in
proving the will as legal and valid. Philis insisted that Durbin, as the
head of her household, earnestly intended for her entitlement to his
estate. As an explicitly listed distributee, she offers the will itself as
proof of his unquestionable design.172 Lastly, the objectors to the will
submit an alternative version of the true intention of the will, and
they envision a radically different plan of distribution, which they
argue as the appropriate version. According to each of these parties,
their version of the past stands as correct.
But in litigation, multiple versions of the same story always exist.
Without this conflict, the issue would become moot; unequal and
unpleasant distributions would not occur, everyone would agree, and
all would accede to a singular account of history. As argued by Paul
Antze and Michael Lambek, interpretive conventions greatly
171
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influence the types of actors and events that receive attention, and
also the kinds of evidence accepted as testaments to the past.173 The
divisive and tumultuous factor of race institutes an additional
narrative convention in recreating the past and viewing the family,
and interracial conflicts aptly illustrate this interpretive diversity. In
interracial inheritance disputes, the color of testamentary freedom
often allowed collateral heirs to deny the existence of mixed race. In
relying on a legal system that rewarded and prioritized the
circumstance of whiteness, testators retained no assurance that their
wishes would be carried out.174
This case effectively demonstrates the color of testamentary
freedom, and the vested property interest of whiteness. First, Mary
Shrine could have jeopardized the Remelys' ability to inherit from
their father’s estate if they were found to have African ancestry. Mrs.
Shrine could have limited the definition of legitimate family to those
persons who could prove themselves white. Secondly, Durbin’s
collateral heirs relied upon the racial privilege afforded them by law
to deny Philis of a monetary legacy that would recognize and
perhaps legitimate her own family. The likelihood of their surprise at
the relationship between Durbin and Philis is low. Yet, the fictional
barricade that facilitated white denial in the face of blatant
knowledge acted to deny people of color from taking part in the
benefits accorded to legally recognized family members.175
Durbin’s siblings indeed objected to the interracial will, as they
appealed to the Equity Court to “cut the Negroes out entirely.”176
They recognized that Durbin’s bequest to his black family was
“sufficient to take up the whole of his interest in his father’s Estate
and that there [was] nothing left for any other party.”177 By
excluding his mistress and children, the sisters attempted to erase the
recorded legacy that entitled former slaves, then current kin, to a
share in Durbin’s estate. William Hubbell wrote a letter advising his
attorneys to “attack…the validity of the will itself” and to absorb all
173
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of Durbin’s interest to “[leave] nothing for it to take effect upon.”178
Their objections to the will, in addition to procuring additional
wealth for themselves, stem from their displeasure with Durbin’s
tenuous relationship with his white family. They complained that
Durbin “never wrote to them, nor sent anything during the
Rebellion” and that “he never sent them a dollar.”179 Additionally,
“he did not even send his Mother money to pay his Father’s funeral
expenses.”180
These letters of objection reveal a desire to reinvent a familial
history devoid of the taint of miscegenation. Hubbell writes that they
wish to “undo what has been done,” explicitly rejecting the past that
Durbin had memorialized in his will.181 In denying the testator’s
death wishes, the collateral heirs recreate history in their own image,
championing themselves as the legally and racially eligible
distributees. Despite the fact that Durbin’s wishes were recorded on
paper and ratified by witnesses, the white tentative heirs retell a story
of Durbin’s ill health, arguing that his disabled condition from the
gun wound led him to write an invalid will. Only “with a load of
shot and wad in his lungs,” they argue, could they rationalize
Durbin’s wishes to spite his family for a gaggle of slaves.182
According to this line of thought, respectable white persons would
not reasonably relinquish their property and wealth to bastards and
Negroes.
Although the white collateral heirs’ depiction of Durbin’s
infirmity and irresponsibility garnered sympathy from the Equity
Court, they did not wholly attempt to derail Philis from her proper
inheritance. But this nominal inclusion must not be confused with
accepting her as a legitimate distributee. They recognized Philis not
as part of Durbin’s family, but as a servant to their father who
deserved compensation “in consideration of her attention…in his
sickness at the Point two or three years before his death.”183 Seeing
themselves as the primary heirs rather than Philis and her children,
the white heirs agreed to allot $2,000 “for her comfort, when she as
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things proceed proves worthy of it.” 184 In stark contrast to Durbin’s
testamentary intent, Philis received a pittance while Elizabeth took
the majority of his estate. The Equity Court Master approved this
consolation scheme, recommending that “it be accepted as
advantageous to [Philis].”185

Conclusion
The conflict that instigated the Remley conflict escaped
traditional legal methods of resolution. The complex nature of the
case required special attention that the courts of the common law
could not adequately provide. Due to the radical changes in the
South’s political, economic, and legal climate caused by the Civil
War, pertinent law that directly and fairly addressed the postwar
administration of an antebellum interracial will did not exist.
Moreover, probate of the will, so soon after the war, yet four years
after the testator’s death, lingered in the postwar instability of South
Carolina’s legal system. Ademption of Durbin’s estate hinged on
whether or not Philis and the children could be considered a loss of
“property” and also a misappropriation of the elder Remley’s estate.
Yet, no slave system existed at the time of probate to fund the estate.
Thus, South Carolina’s Equity Court heard the case because it did
not fit into existing rules of law, administering a ruling with a
heightened sensitivity to the individual interests of the parties.186
This courtly invocation of empathy viewed the disinheritance of
white heirs (in favor of black ones) as a viable application for
equitable principles.
This case, which spans both antebellum and postwar regimes,
forces an examination of public secrets being legally recognized. As
Austin Sarat argues, “memory may be attached, or attach itself, to

184

In the end, Philis bore the brunt of Durbin’s original will. Out of the $2,000
allotted to her, all debts and legal fees were deducted, and half of this amount was
given to Optimus Hughes, the administrator. Thus, Philis received money, but she
was required to pay the costs generated from the white heirs’ objections. Order
(August 12, 1867) (RCSCHS).
185 Remley Case Masters Report (July 5, 1867) (RCSCHS).
186 See Barry Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2002).

35

MAILLARD (SYRACUSE)

law and be preserved in and through law.”187 This method of
constructing the past in relation to the juridical structures particular
to a place and time works to legitimate and authorize an historical
account of possibilities and improbabilities. This is a surprising
result from a contemporary viewpoint. To imagine that a former
slave’s right to inheritance decreased after the Civil War confounds a
modern understanding of historical memory. It is far easier to
imagine Philis’s chances of inheritance as secure after the war, but it
is more difficult to interpret her diminishing rights after the domestic
conflict that presumably attempted to enable them. Furthermore, to
examine her shrinking interest in Durbin’s estate in light of his
testamentary wishes presents a peculiar definition of “equity.”
While this translates to an overt assertion of racial supremacy in
objection to clear testamentary intent, it also demonstrates a shrewd
manipulation of legal definitions of family. The Hubbells portray his
effort as a wanton death desire of a country planter “with a load of
shot and wad in his lungs.”188
The claim of incapacity allows the collateral heirs to make
legal sense of Durbin’s unconventional assertion of a multiracial
family in the antebellum and postwar South.189 Yet, Durbin did not
marry Philis, even though Philis was technically not a slave and state
law permitted interracial marriages at the time of his death. Had he
married her, his siblings would not have had legal grounds to contest
the will, and the combination of her free status and her spousal
protection would have enabled her to inherit without restriction.
Yet, South Carolina law enabled the white heirs to succeed in their
will challenge because the legal system upheld the restricted notion
of a white, legitimate, recognized family—which did not include
Philis and the children.
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State law resisted the probate of Durbin’s will as he intended. His
testamentary objective was clear—he wanted to provide for Philis
and the children, and leave his sister with nothing. The competing
conceptions of family—his black one and his white one—find
different treatments in South Carolina courts. Even though he made
provisions for Philis’s “use, clothing and comfort,” he could not
overcome the legal privilege accorded to free whites. His collateral
heirs were able to capitalize upon the law’s favoring of free, white
persons as a way of denying any recognition of Philis as a family
member. Moreover, the massive transformations stemming from the
Civil War changed the composition of Durbin’s estate. The Civil
War, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the weakening of the
southern plantocracy undermined Philis’s claim to her share of
Durbin’s property. He neither lived to see the economic devaluation
of his property nor the legal wranglings that weakened his own
family’s testamentary interests. He did not foresee that law would
force his posthumous gifts toward the family that he wished to
disinherit. These influences, in addition to the challenges presented
by the Hubbells, precluded Philis, the rightful heir, from obtaining
her due legacy.
This historical failure of donative intent stifles the possibility of
marginalized families to secure their due inheritance. Not limited to
finances alone, law’s role in quashing the testator’s intent
underscores a collective belief in the normativity of traditional
families. In this way, the larger legal system supports testamentary
larceny in blatant contradiction to explicit legal language
recognizing, promoting, and memorializing intimate connections
between black and white. Testamentary freedom, in all of its
aspirational claims, means nothing in the face of a legal system
rooted in the restrictive and damaging conformity of “legitimate”
families. In the case of the Remleys, Durbin’s “family” did not exist
as a reality in a legal regime that defined intimacy in terms of black
and white, with nothing in between.
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